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Abstract: This paper investigates the effect of changes in payroll taxes on wages and 
employment in Argentina. The analysis, based on administrative data, focuses on the impact of a 
series of major changes in payroll taxes which varied across geographical areas. This setup offers 
two main advantages over previous studies. First, using longitudinal data, the variation in tax 
rates across space and time provides a plausible source of identification of their effects on 
employment and wages. Second, the use of legal tax rates for each area at each point in time 
provides a remedy for the measurement error bias raised by the use of empirical rates constructed 
from observed tax and wage bills. Once this bias is accounted for, the results indicate that 
changes in payroll tax rates are only partially shifted onto wages, and they point to the absence of 
any significant effect on employment. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The appropriate level of payroll taxes and their influence on labor markets are hotly debated 
issues (see, among others, Nickell and Layard, 1999). While such taxes usually constitute an 
important source of government revenue, they drive a wedge between the cost of labor for a firm 
and the net wage of the worker, and may therefore have distortional effects on the functioning of 
the labor market. The introduction of a payroll tax implies a downward shift in the labor demand 
schedule equivalent to the amount of the tax, and standard partial equilibrium incidence analysis 
states that the extent of shifting from employers to workers depends on the elasticities of labor 
demand and supply.  
 
However, taxes and social security contributions do not necessarily reduce workers’ perceived 
income. Social security contributions may also be regarded as deferred consumption when they 
take the form, for example, of contributions to public pension programs (Summers, 1989). The 
introduction of a new payroll tax will presumably translate into an outward shift of the labor 
supply curve, thereby increasing the negative effect of the tax on wages but reducing its impact 
on employment (Gruber and Krueger, 1990). Such adjustments could be prevented, however, 
through the use of bargaining systems that preclude downward adjustments in wages (Dolado et 
al., 1996). In the case we study in this paper, however, it is unlikely that workers would perceive 
any significant change in their permanent income through future payroll-tax induced revenues. 
Thus, there would only be a downward shift in the demand schedule as a result of the changes in 
payroll-taxes studied in this paper. 
 
The relative levels of labor demand and supply elasticities, the presence of offsets, and the 
resulting incidence of the payroll tax are, ultimately, empirical questions, although there is a 
relatively small amount of definitive evidence on the subject. Earlier studies include Brittain’s 
(1971) cross-country analysis, which finds full shifting of the tax to the worker’s remuneration, 
and Holmlund (1983), which finds partial shifting based on time series evidence from the 
Swedish economy. Most of the shortcomings of cross-country and time series studies are 
overcome by Gruber’s (1997) influential study of Chile’s 1981 major social security reform and 
the resulting reduction of payroll taxes by around 25 percentage points. This study, based on a 
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panel survey of manufacturing plants, compares wages and employment before and after the 
reform and finds evidence of a full shifting of taxes to wages, with no significant employment 
effects. Gruber’s (1997) data, however, contain no information on the statutory tax rates applied 
to each company, which are conjectured to have changed across the board for the whole country 
at one point in time. His study relies on firm-specific empirical tax rates that are calculated by 
dividing total tax payments by wages. Despite the advantage of having information on the actual 
tax liability for every firm in the panel, any shock and/or measurement error in wages (the 
dependent variable) will be reflected as a spurious correlation in the regression results, since the 
tax rate is by definition a function of wages. 
 
Our study exploits a series of major policy shifts in labor taxation which were introduced in 
Argentina during the period 1995-2001, following a social security reform and other market-
oriented changes in the economy. The setting, a middle-income developing country in South 
America, is reminiscent of Gruber’s (1997) Chilean study. However, the Argentine policy reform 
varied by region, while the Chilean study and later contributions to the literature (Kugler and 
Kugler, 2003) are based on uniform economy-wide changes or on firm-varying tax levels 
(Anderson and Meyer, 1997; Murphy, 2007). Starting from an almost uniform national payroll 
tax level, the Argentine reform introduced a wide range of rates that varied by geographical area. 
Moreover, the full set of region-specific legal tax rates were reconstructed from the relevant 
laws, executive orders (“decretos”) and the software created by the tax authorities which is used 
by firms to compute tax liabilities.
2
 Full information is available on the exact legal tax rates 
applying to firms in each of the regions of the country, which eliminates the problems of 
spurious regression that might arise from purely observational tax rates.
3
  
 
These three characteristics (geographical variation, time variation and the availability of exact 
legal tax rates) constitute the backbone of the identification strategy pursued below. In the spirit 
of Gruber and Krueger (1990) and of Besley and Burgess (2004), the unit of analysis is a 
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 The working paper version of this article reports the relevant decrees and presents examples of the tax software 
used by firms to compute payroll tax liabilities (Cruces, Galiani and Kidyba, 2010). 
3
 While this is also true in Anderson and Meyer’s (1997) and Murphy’s (2007) studies of unemployment insurance 
tax rates in the United States, the presence of experience rating effectively introduces a firm-specific component into 
the tax rate, and there is, consequently, no single uniform tax rate by geographical area in these studies. 
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geographical area, and the study is based on an administrative panel dataset containing monthly 
aggregates of payroll, tax and employment figures. 
 
The following section presents a brief account of the institutional setting for the Argentine labor 
market and its reform during the period under study. Section 3 describes the data and the 
construction of the variables used in the analysis. Section 4 presents the main empirical results, 
and Section 5 describes a series of robustness checks. Conclusions follow. 
 
2. Payroll taxes in Argentina during the 1990s 
 
When a new administration took office in 1989, a series of market-oriented structural reforms 
were introduced in the Argentine economy. In 1991, the Federal Government consolidated the 
level of payroll taxes
4
 at 33 percent of the wage for employers and at 16 percent for employees, 
resulting in a total non-wage labor cost of 49 percent of the wage.
5
 A major social security 
reform was established by Act 24.241 of September 1993. This statute mandated a new, fully 
funded pension system, which both new workers and those in the existing pay-as-you-go regime 
could join. It also provided a unified framework for the collection and distribution of employer 
and employee contributions to the social security system. The data used in this paper is taken 
from this administrative source, which went online in July 1994.  
 
Based on the belief that lower taxes would reduce unemployment and promote the formalization 
of the labor market, the social security reform law also gave the Executive the power to diminish 
the “tax incidence on labor costs”. The main policy instrument was the determination of payroll 
tax “reduction coefficients” by geographical area and the subsequent modification of these 
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 Firms were required to make just one total payment to the tax bureau. The payroll tax rate was in fact the sum of a 
series of different components that were subsumed into this payment. Some areas in the sparsely populated 
provinces of the Patagonia region in the south of the country had traditionally benefited from a rebate in one of these 
components (family allowances), which is why the rates were not completely uniform across the country. MTSS 
(1998) and Neffa (2005) provide an in-depth account of labor and social security regulations during this period. 
5
 While payroll tax rates were modified, the definition of taxable income and the tax ceiling (the upper limit on the 
wage sum to which the tax rate was applied) for individual wages were constant and uniform across the country, 
which reduces the variation to only one dimension (Murphy, 2007). The ceiling refers to the computation of the 
payroll tax and was not affected by the tax changes – full payroll taxes t or reduced rates t(1-c) were applied 
throughout the period to wages in the zero-ceiling interval. Moreover, employee contributions were unaffected over 
the period under study. 
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coefficients. In terms of tax administration, Argentina is divided into 85 areas.
6
 In December 
1993, an executive order was issued that assigned a “reduction coefficient” c ranging from 30 to 
80 percent (11 coefficients in 5 percentage-point steps) to each of these areas. Each area’s 
payroll tax thus corresponded to the national rate, t, reduced proportionally by this coefficient: 
t(1-c). Taxes were thus reduced from an almost uniform rate of 33 percent to a range of values 
between 6.6 and 23.1 percent (corresponding to the extreme cases of 80 percent and 30 percent 
reductions, respectively). The first panel in Table 1 presents the summary statistics on the 
reduction coefficients for the 85 administrative areas.  
 
Table 1: Payroll tax rates and area characteristics 
  Areas 
Simple 
Average 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. 
5
th
 
perc. 
95
th
 
perc. 
Reduction coefficient 
(Executive order 2609/93) 
85 0.59 0.11 0.30 0.80 0.40 0.75 
Percentage of population 
with basic needs deficit 
85 0.22 0.07 0.08 0.38 0.12 0.33 
Distance to Buenos Aires in 
1000s of km 
85 1.07 0.57 0.00 3.15 0.41 1.89 
Legal rate               
March 1995 85 0.233 0.037 0.165 0.330 0.171 0.297 
January 1996 85 0.163 0.028 0.104 0.239 0.118 0.212 
January 1999 85 0.163 0.028 0.104 0.239 0.118 0.212 
August 1999 85 0.138 0.022 0.092 0.197 0.102 0.176 
June 2001 85 0.138 0.022 0.092 0.197 0.102 0.176 
September 2001 85 0.210 0.000 0.210 0.210 0.210 0.210 
Empirical rate             
March 1995 85 0.226 0.037 0.139 0.302 0.169 0.287 
January 1996 85 0.163 0.030 0.106 0.226 0.114 0.208 
January 1999 85 0.155 0.028 0.107 0.221 0.113 0.198 
August 1999 85 0.133 0.022 0.093 0.231 0.098 0.167 
June 2001 85 0.147 0.029 0.105 0.291 0.111 0.183 
September 2001 85 0.194 0.011 0.161 0.250 0.180 0.207 
 
 
The consolidated payroll tax rate of 1991 and the reduction coefficients established in 1993 were 
the basis of Government interventions on payroll taxes during the 1990s, and provide the source 
                                                 
6
 Argentina is a Federal State, which is divided into 23 provinces and one autonomous city. The “areas” defined by 
the tax bureau do not cross provincial boundaries. These areas usually correspond either to the capital of the 
province, to one or two major urban areas, or to the rest of the province.  
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of identification for this study. The coefficients for each of the 85 areas were, by executive order, 
set on the basis of poverty levels and the distance to the country’s capital, Buenos Aires. These 
criteria were chosen in order to compensate for differential development levels and for location 
costs, respectively. The regression results shown in the first column of Table 2 indicate that these 
reduction coefficients are well explained by the criteria mentioned above: distance to Buenos 
Aires and the percentage of population with basic needs deficits gathered from the 1991 census. 
Moreover, the reductions were differential within regions, with poorer areas receiving higher 
reduction coefficients than their richer neighbors, as attested to by the regression shown in the 
second column of Table 2, where the distance and poverty variables remain significant even after 
including regional controls. These results are consistent with the assignment of tax reduction 
coefficients based on pre-established rules, rules that could not be manipulated by the local 
authorities.
7
 The third and fourth columns of Table 2 present the results from a regression of the 
resulting “reduced” tax rates t(1-c) in 1995 against the same variables, for all the 85 regions and 
for the 49 regions upon which our empirical analysis below is based. As expected, these binding 
legal tax rates are negatively related to poverty and distance to the capital.
8
 
 
This study focuses on the period from the second quarter of 1995 up to the end of 2001, during 
which labor taxes were mostly uniform within geographical areas.
9
 Over this period, the average 
level of payroll taxes was modified three times by means of changes in the reduction coefficients 
c. The weighted national aggregates in Figure 1 illustrate these changes: the reduction 
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 The process for assigning these coefficients, while cumbersome, was clear and left no room for manipulation from 
local authorities. The tax reduction coefficients ranged from 30 to 80 percent (11 coefficients in 5 percentage-point 
steps). These coefficients were not assigned arbitrarily to the administrative areas. Each province was assigned one 
“round” level (i.e., 30 or 50) which was applied to its main urban area. The rest of the province was then assigned a 
coefficient with 5 more percentage points (for instance, 50 percent for the province capital and 55 for the rest of the 
province). There was thus no room for manipulation within a province. The allocation of the “round” reduction 
coefficients by province was determined by the province’s structural factors (distance to Buenos Aires and poverty 
levels in 1991), as shown in Table 2. Also, inspection of the regression residuals (not reported) shows that there are 
no outliers, which would have been likely to arise in the presence of systematic manipulations of the initial 
assignment. Finally, while tax levels changed over the period, the “change categories” remained fixed over the 
period under study, indicating that local governments were not able to change the initial assignment. Further 
modifications after 1993 were done en masse: all reduction coefficients were increased or decreased by the same 
amount (i.e., 10, 20 or 30 percentage points). 
8
 The same relationship holds at other points in time during our sampling period, and when regional controls are 
excluded.  
9
 The year 1994 and the first quarter of 1995 were discarded because payroll tax rates also varied by sector, which 
resulted in heterogeneous tax rates within geographical areas. As already mentioned, after this period, the rates were 
still not completely uniform across geographical areas because of the reduction in the family allowances components 
in the Patagonia region that prevailed until January 2006. 
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coefficients were lowered at the end of 1995 and again in early 1999, and then were raised in 
mid-2001.  
 
The specifics of these changes are as follows: from March to September 1995, payroll taxes in 
each area corresponded to the full national rate of 33 percent reduced by the coefficients c 
ranging from 0 to 50 percent, resulting in tax rates from 16.5 to 33 percent.
10
 The coefficients c 
were then increased by 30 percentage points (in steps of 10 percentage points) over the period 
October 1995-March 1996, and then remained at those levels until January 1999, resulting in tax 
levels ranging from 10.4 to 23.9 percent.
11
 The reduction coefficients c were increased again in 
February-July 1999. Finally, in mid-2001, the coefficients were eliminated and a uniform 
national payroll tax rate of 21 percent was established. The changes made in these legal tax rates 
at key turning points are depicted in the second panel of Table 1. 
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 The 1995 reduction coefficients correspond to the original 1993 coefficients (ranging from 30 to 80 percent), 
which were then decreased by 30 percentage points due to fiscal considerations, resulting in c levels of 0 to 50 
percent.  
11
 The increase in the reduction coefficients included a minor change in the way they were implemented. The health 
contribution component of 5 percent was excluded from the reduction, resulting in the range reported: 
[0.05+0.27*(1-0.8)=0.104; 0.05+0.27*(1-0.3)=0.239] 
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Table 2: Determinants of payroll tax rate “reduction coefficients” 
  Reduction Coefficient    
Legal tax rate, August 
1995   
Executive Order 
2609/93, 1993 
 
Percentage of population 
with basic needs deficit 
0.776 0.519  -0.153  -0.177 
[0.111]*** [0.103]***  [0.036]***  [0.061]*** 
Distance to Buenos Aires 0.094 0.066  -0.034  -0.036 
 [0.013]*** [0.017]***  [0.006]***  [0.009]*** 
Region: Cuyo 
 0.170  -0.039  -0.037 
 [0.042]***  [0.015]***  [0.018]** 
Region: NOA (north-west) 
 0.208  -0.056  -0.055 
 [0.041]***  [0.014]***  [0.019]*** 
Region: NOE (north-east) 
 0.292  -0.086  -0.081 
 [0.044]***  [0.015]***  [0.019]*** 
Region: Pampeana 
 0.147  -0.041  -0.039 
 [0.035]***  [0.012]***  [0.015]** 
Region: Patagonica 
 0.160  -0.045  -0.036 
 [0.045]***  [0.016]***  [0.022] 
Constant 0.317 0.236  0.349  0.353 
 [0.027]*** [0.035]***  [0.012]***  [0.015]*** 
Observations 85 85  85   49 
R-squared 0.58 0.76   0.76   0.81 
Standard errors in brackets;  *** significant at 1%. Omitted region: Greater Buenos Aires 
metropolitan area. Note: the last column only includes data for the 49 selected areas. 
 
Figure 1: Payroll tax rate reductions and level of employment 
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3. Data  
 
As stated above, the Argentine tax authority divided the country into administrative areas that 
were then assigned differing payroll tax rates. This study is based on a panel dataset of these 
areas that contains monthly aggregates of payroll, tax and employment figures. The unit of 
analysis is therefore the geographical area. The data are collected on a monthly basis by the 
Sistema Integrado de Jubilaciones y Pensiones [Integrated Retirement and Pension System] 
(SIJP), which covers all formal-sector employees in the country (about 60 percent of the 
workforce over this period). The dataset used in this study excludes agricultural workers (whose 
employment and wage levels are highly cyclical) and public employees, since the public sector 
was excluded from the changes in payroll taxation introduced over the period analyzed in this 
paper.
12
 This selection criterion results in a total count from 3.1 to 3.8 million workers over the 
period studied (Figure 1). This administrative dataset is supplemented by a carefully constructed 
set of legally binding taxes for each geographical area based on legislative sources (the laws and 
executive orders mentioned in the previous section) and on the software created by the tax 
bureau which is used by firms to compute their tax liabilities (AFIP, 2006). 
 
The data consists of one observation per month (t) by geographical area (z). The variables consist 
of area aggregates, and they include total monthly employment ztE , total monthly wage 
payments ztW , and total monthly payroll tax payments ztTaxbill .
13
 These variables are used to 
define the dependent variables of interest, the logarithm of average wages )ln(
zt
zt
E
W
 and the 
logarithm of employment )ln( ztE . The legally binding tax rate corresponding to area z at time t 
is 
c
ztT , while the empirical tax rate for each area is defined as the total tax bill divided by the total 
wage bill, and thus given by 
zt
zt
W
Taxbill
ztT  . Finally, data are available on the monthly distribution of 
employment by sector of activity within each area ( sztS , s = 1 to 20).
14
 
                                                 
12
 Provincial public workers were incorporated only gradually into the unified pension system. Private-sector 
workers have all been in the system since its inception.  
13
 The period 1994-2001 was exceptional in that the annual rate of inflation was close to zero during the whole 
period. 
14
 The sectors are: mining, manufacturing, public utilities, construction, commerce, hotels and restaurants, transport 
and telecommunications, banking and finance, real estate, education and teaching, health, cultural services, domestic 
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Table 3: Summary statistics (regression variables) 
  Obs. 
Simple 
Average 
Std. 
Dev. 
Minimum Maximum 
Monthly data 
Legal tax rate 4018 0.163 0.043 0.092 0.330 
Empirical tax rate 4018 0.155 0.037 0.084 0.309 
Employment (1000s) 4018 70.8 177.6 2.5 1132.9 
Log of employment 4018 3.136 1.233 0.925 7.033 
Average wage 4018 754.4 236.2 427.2 2022.4 
Log of average wage 4018 6.586 0.273 6.057 7.612 
These summary statistics correspond to the 49 areas selected for the regressions over the 
period March 1995-December 2001. 
 
Table 1 presents a series of descriptive statistics of these variables at different points in time for 
the 85 areas. Since the data include only formal sector employees and exclude public sector and 
agricultural workers, sparsely populated administrative areas have an extremely low number of 
workers recorded per month. Data from these areas are prone to measurement error and are 
highly sensitive to idiosyncratic circumstances. This is evident when comparing the extreme 
values of the empirical rates in Table 1 with those given for the 5
th
 and 95
th
 percentiles.
15
 For this 
reason, only areas with at least 2,500 employees per month were retained.
16
 Moreover, the 
dataset does not include data after December 2001. After the January 2002 economic crisis and 
devaluation, the new administration introduced a series of changes and exceptions to payroll tax 
regulations that implied that the rates varied greatly by sector and by type of worker.
17
 This data 
selection process resulted in a panel of 49 areas spanning 82 months (from March 1995 to 
December 2001), with a total of 4,018 monthly observations. 
 
The summary statistics of the variables defined above for the selected areas are presented in 
                                                                                                                                                             
services, janitors and building maintenance, private security, research and development, administrative union 
workers, administrative workers, and others. 
15
 For instance, firms might be one month late in paying their tax bill, which would lead to the registration of a very 
low figure, followed by a very high figure, in the tax payment system. In a large area, this type of error is likely to 
average out, but in small areas with very few formal-sector employees, a single firm could have a significant effect 
on the overall empirical tax rate. 
16
 Of the 50 areas that matched the selection criteria, one additional area was eliminated because of the very high 
variability in employment and wages found there, as the standard deviation of these variables was several orders of 
magnitude higher than it was in the rest of the areas. Anderson and Meyer (1997) discuss the issue of extreme values 
in administrative data and apply similar selection mechanisms. 
17
 It should also be noted that the devaluation of Argentina’s currency in January 2002 resulted in an increase in the 
price level. Inflation and the potential regional heterogeneity in price changes imply a great deal of noise in the real 
value of wages, one of the two main dependent variables of the analysis in this paper. 
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Table 3. As expected, the legal and empirical tax rates vary over a wide range, from 9.2 to 33 
percent. The areas also differ markedly in monthly levels of employment, from a low of 2,500 
employees to more than 1.1 million workers in the city of Buenos Aires at some point within the 
observation period. Average salaries, in turn, were 754.4 pesos over the period studied 
(equivalent to nominal US dollars for the period under study), but ranged from 427.2 to 2,022.4 
pesos. These figures reflect the wide geographical variation that exists in income levels and 
standards of living in Argentina.
18
 
 
4. Identification strategy and empirical results 
 
The incidence of the payroll tax rate, and thus its relationship with levels of wages and 
employment, are estimated by means of ordinary least squares regressions. The basic regressions 
correspond to empirical models employed previously in the literature: 
zttzztE
W
Tax
zt
zt   1)ln(     (1) 
zttzztzt TaxE   2)ln(     (2) 
where the dependent variables are defined as above, the tax variable is either the empirical rate 
ztT  or the legal rate 
c
ztT , z  is a set of area fixed effects, t  is a set of time period fixed effects, 
and zt  is the residual term.
 19
   
 
These regressions correspond to two-way fixed effect error component models. The key 
identification assumption is that the tax rate is strictly exogenous, conditional on the fixed 
                                                 
18
 It should be noted that the range of monthly wages is influenced by the “aguinaldo” (an extra monthly salary per 
year i.e., a “13th month’s pay”, which is customary in some Latin American countries), paid in halves in Argentina 
in June and December. Excluding these months, the average wage is 698.7 pesos, and the range is reduced to 427.2-
1,465.6 pesos. All the regressions shown below include month fixed effects that will control for these cyclical 
increases in the wage bill. 
19
 An alternative empirical tax rate can be computed by dividing the tax bill by the taxable (or “imposable”) wage 
aggregate 
imp
ztW , resulting in 
imp
ztzt
imp
zt WTaxbillT / (the blue line in Figure 1). This aggregate is similar to the total 
wage bill, but it accounts for minimum and maximum thresholds for payroll taxes and some non-taxable 
components of the wage bill. It should be noted that these ceilings did not vary over the period under study. While 
this rate is much closer to the legal one, ztT  is used in the previous literature, and its use therefore yields more 
comparable results. While not reported for space reasons, empirical results using 
imp
ztT  are qualitatively similar to 
those obtained using ztT , although coefficients are lower in absolute terms but consistently higher than those 
obtained with 
c
ztT .  
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effects. As differences in the levels of the dependent variable are controlled for by these fixed 
effects, the assumption implies that changes in tax rates are taken to be uncorrelated with 
changes in unobservables. Section 5 below addresses the challenges to the identification strategy. 
 
The panel dataset used for the estimation spans 82 months and 49 geographical areas. Another 
source of concern might arise from the high frequency of observations, which could induce serial 
correlation. However, all of the results below report standard errors clustered at the area level, 
which implies that no restrictions are imposed on the area level regression residuals. In 
particular, the residuals are allowed to be correlated over time, and with a relatively large 
number of clusters (as in this case) this accounts for potential autocorrelation. (Angrist and 
Pischke, 2008, Chapter 8).  
 
Table 4: Main results 
    Dependent Variables 
   
Log of Average 
Wage 
 
Log of 
Employment 
Empirical tax rate  -1.005   0.465  
(tax bill/total wage bill) [0.235]***  [0.503]  
Legal tax rate   -0.501   0.270 
     [0.192]**    [0.482] 
R2 within  0.91 0.91  0.44 0.44 
R2 between  0.04 0.10  0.45 0.51 
R2 overall  0.25 0.25  0.03 0.02 
Observations  4018 
Number of areas   49 
Note: * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant 
at 1 percent. All regressions include 49 area and 82 month fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered at the area level. 
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The coefficients   from the simple models given by Equations (1) and (2) are presented in 
Table 4 for both alternative tax rates. The results follow the same pattern, with negative and 
highly significant coefficients for the wage regressions, and positive coefficients not significantly 
different from zero for the employment regressions. The coefficient for the empirical tax rate in 
the monthly wage regressions is -1.005, which corresponds to the full shifting hypothesis, but the 
use of the legal tax rate results in a coefficient of -0.501, about half that value.
20
 
 
This result may shed some light on the previous literature. As suggested by Gruber (1997), 
measurement error in wages ztW  may introduce a spurious correlation between the dependent 
variable )ln(
ztE
ztW  and the empirical tax rate 
zt
zt
W
Taxbill
ztT  . In such circumstances, an instrumental 
variable could capture the exogenous variability in the tax rate beyond this spurious correlation. 
However, this is not the case in this context. The exact measure of the tax rate 
c
ztT  reflects only 
true variability in tax liability. The results of Table 4 therefore seem to favor the hypothesis of 
partial shifting of taxes to wages over the hypothesis of full shifting.  
                                                 
20
 The coefficients for the empirical and for the legal tax rate in the average wage regression in Table 4 are 
statistically different at the one percent level of significance. The same qualitative result holds for each pair of 
average wage regression in Tables 5 and 6: the equality of coefficients is strongly rejected at standard levels of 
significance. The tests for equality of tax rate coefficients (not reported) are implemented after joint estimation of 
each pair of equations by seemingly unrelated regression. 
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5. Robustness checks 
The key identification assumption in the simple estimations presented above is that the changes 
in tax rates are not correlated with the changes in unobservables. This assumption faces a series 
of challenges. It would be invalid, for instance, if there was regression to the mean, that is, if the 
changes in the tax rates were the response to changes in outcomes. This effect can be ruled out 
because of the strict rule that assigned changes in tax rates to geographical areas, which stayed 
fixed during the whole period of analysis, as discussed in Section 2. Another challenge to the 
identification assumption arises from the possibility that areas might have different secular 
trends, and these trends might be correlated with the changes in tax rates. To address this 
concern, the estimations presented in the following pages include controls for regional 
heterogeneity and region and time-specific controls for unobserved shocks. 
 
The above models do not include any controls other than time and area fixed effects. Since the 
data are taken from administrative sources, the set of control variables is narrower than it would 
be in the case of survey data. However, since the data are provided by sector, it is possible to 
include the share of employment in each sector as additional control variables. The employment 
shares sztS  can control for time-varying factors within geographical areas not captured by the 
fixed effects z .
21
 The augmented models are given by: 
zt
s
sztstzztE
W
STax
zt
zt   1)ln(  (3) 
zt
s
sztstzztzt STaxE   2)ln(  (4) 
The corresponding results are reported in the first panel of Table 5 for the empirical and the legal 
tax rates. A comparison between the coefficients in the first panel of Table 5 and those in Table 4 
suggests that the sector employment controls do not modify the qualitative nature of the original 
results; the coefficients of the tax rates in the wage regressions are negative and highly 
significant, while those in the employment regressions are not significantly different from zero.
22
 
                                                 
21
 Moreover, the tax rate varied by sector between February and July 1999 and again from July 2001 onward, so the 
inclusion of these variables may control for the differences in tax rates within areas.  
22
 The comparison of results in Tables 4 and 5 also indicates a difference in measures of goodness of fit. The 
“within” R squared corresponds to the R squared from an OLS regression with de-meaned variables, and it naturally 
increases when adding the employment-sector controls. The “between” and “overall” statistics, however, are 
squared correlations and do not have the properties of OLS R squares (StataCorp, 2009). Specifically, the “between” 
statistic increases when adding sector controls in the log wage regressions, but it diminishes drastically for the log 
employment estimations. Since the “between” R squared is the squared correlation between the means of the 
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The difference between estimates with the empirical and the legal tax rate still holds: the use of 
the empirical tax rate biases the coefficient downward and away from zero. The main difference 
is that the coefficients in the wage regressions are about 20 percent higher (in absolute value) 
when these controls are introduced. The coefficient of the legal tax rate of -0.644 still indicates 
less than full shifting. 
 
The identification of the payroll tax effect in the models of Equations (1)-(4) is given by the 
differential evolution over time of the payroll tax rates across the 49 areas used in the analysis. 
However, as discussed above and shown by the summary statistics in Tables 1 and 3, these areas 
are heterogeneous, ranging from large and relatively affluent cities to smaller and poorer areas. It 
is therefore possible that these areas would have had different secular trends of wages and 
employment even if payroll taxes had not changed. To verify that the identified effects are not an 
artifact of differential secular trends across regions, the models in Equations (5) and (6) 
incorporate time controls interacted with a series of different area grouping indicators jG :  
 
zt
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GSTax
zt
zt   )ln(  (5) 
zt
j
jt
s
sztstzztzt GSTaxE   )ln(  (6) 
These models add a full set of interactions between the time period and the jG  grouping 
variables. The second and third panels of Table 5 present the results of these models with two 
alternative groupings defined as follows: in the second panel, the areas were ranked by their 
average level of employment over the whole period and were then divided into 9 groups of 5 and 
one group of 4 (corresponding to the four largest units). In the third panel, a similar procedure 
was followed, except that the 10 groups were obtained by ranking areas by average wages. In the 
fourth panel, the 49 areas were evenly divided into three broad geographical regions: the North, 
the Center (including the Pampeana and Buenos Aires Metropolitan Areas) and the South 
(including Cuyo and Patagonia). As in the first panel, all the regressions also include the controls 
for employment-sector distribution. 
                                                                                                                                                             
predicted values and the means of the actual values of the dependent variable, this indicates that the fixed effects in 
Table 4 regression’s were capturing mean levels of employment, but that the addition of time-varying sector controls 
might increase the precision of the prediction over time but not necessarily for average values.  
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Table 5: Robustness checks (sector controls and time/category interactions) 
    Dependent Variables 
    Log of Average Wage   Log of Employment 
   Controls for employment-sector distributions 
Empirical tax rate  -1.200   0.380  
(tax bill/total wage bill)  [0.194]***   [0.406]  
Legal tax rate   -0.644   0.456 
   [0.151]***   [0.410] 
R2 within  0.93 0.92  0.60 0.60 
R2 between  0.38 0.40  0.03 0.02 
R2 overall  0.47 0.47  0.01 0.01 
   
Controls for employment-sector distributions and full interactions between 
time period and indicators for 10 groups ordered by employment level 
Empirical tax rate  -1.458   0.122  
(tax bill/total wage bill)  [0.271]***   [0.582]  
Legal tax rate   -0.742   0.223 
   [0.254]***   [0.661] 
R2 within  0.94 0.94  0.68 0.68 
R2 between  0.29 0.32  0.03 0.02 
R2 overall  0.44 0.45  0.02 0.01 
   
Controls for employment-sector distributions and full interactions between 
time period and indicators for 10 groups ordered by average wage 
Empirical tax rate  -1.347   0.532  
(tax bill/total wage bill)  [0.190]***   [0.496]  
Legal tax rate   -0.957   0.777 
   [0.191]***   [0.538] 
R2 within  0.94 0.94  0.69 0.69 
R2 between  0.27 0.20  0.08 0.05 
R2 overall  0.45 0.41  0.05 0.03 
   
Controls for employment-sector distributions and full interactions between 
time period and indicators for 3 regional groupings (North, Center and South) 
Empirical tax rate  -1.315   -0.124  
(tax bill/total wage bill)  [0.290]***   [0.475]  
Legal tax rate   -0.542   -0.102 
   [0.303]*   [0.588] 
R2 within  0.93 0.93  0.63 0.63 
R2 between  0.23 0.30  0.09 0.09 
R2 overall  0.41 0.43  0.04 0.05 
Observations  4018 
Number of areas   49 
Note: * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. All regressions 
include 49 area and 82 month fixed effects, and controls for the proportion of employment in each of 19 
sectoral categories at every time period in each area. Standard errors are clustered at the area level. 
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The interactions between time effects and groups defined by levels of the dependent variables 
(wages and employment) address the concern that the results in Table 4 might follow from a 
spurious correlation between changes in taxes and differential trends by area, which would not 
be captured by the area fixed effects. The rationale is that larger (or richer) areas might share 
different shocks from those of smaller (or poorer) areas, while the former experienced lower tax 
reductions than the latter. Including time controls interacted with groups defined by the level of 
the dependent variables helps ruling out spurious correlation in the previous results. This 
procedure is akin to allowing for different slopes by the level of the intercept in simple difference 
in differences models.  
 
The results for the employment-level and wage-group trends are similar to those obtained in 
Table 4 and in the first panel of Table 5: the coefficients for the wage regressions are negative 
and highly significant, while those for the employment regressions are not statistically different 
from zero. The fact that the results are still significant after the introduction of these controls 
indicates that the results are not driven by spurious correlation caused by differential trends or 
shocks. The coefficients for the wage regressions, however, are now even higher in absolute 
terms: they are well above 1 for the empirical tax rate, and for the legal rate they are much closer 
to 1 than in Table 4, especially when wage-group trends are included. With employment size-
time controls and region-time controls, however, the coefficient of the legal tax rate indicates 
less than full shifting.  
 
Finally, Table 6 provides a breakdown of the main results according to the different stages of tax 
changes defined in the previous section. The top panel presents the results for the tax reduction 
episodes (March 1995-June 2000), while the bottom panel displays the estimates derived from 
the model in Equations (3) and (4) for the tax increase only (July 2000-December 2001). There 
are two noteworthy facts regarding these additional results. First, only the coefficients of the 
wage equations for the tax reduction episode are significant, with the same pattern as before: the 
coefficients for the empirical tax rates are higher, in absolute value, than those for the legal rate. 
Second, the significant coefficients appear to be higher, in absolute value, than those shown in 
Tables 4 and 5.  
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On the other hand, none of the coefficients seem to be significantly different from zero for the 
estimations limited to the tax increase period (starting in July 2000, one calendar year before the 
increase to December 2001). It should be noted, however, that the increase to a common national 
payroll tax rate was implemented in mid-2001. There is only about half a year’s worth of data 
with the new rate, which greatly reduces the statistical power of this analysis.  
 
Table 6: Results by period 
    Dependent Variables 
    
Log of Average 
Wage 
  Log of Employment 
   Periods 1 and 2 (tax cuts) 
Empirical tax rate  -1.957   -0.780  
(tax bill/total wage bill) [0.313]***  [0.499]  
Legal tax rate   -1.232   -0.772 
     [0.306]***   [0.748] 
R2 within  0.91 0.91  0.44 0.44 
R2 between  0.04 0.10  0.45 0.51 
R2 overall  0.25 0.25  0.03 0.02 
Observations  3136 
   Period 3 (tax increase) 
Empirical tax rate  -0.269   0.033  
(tax bill/total wage bill) [0.222]   [0.128]  
Legal tax rate   0.195   0.001 
     [0.179]     [0.095] 
R2 within  0.91 0.91  0.44 0.44 
R2 between  0.04 0.10  0.45 0.51 
R2 overall  0.25 0.25  0.03 0.02 
Observations  882 
Number of areas   49 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 
percent. All regressions include 49 area and 82 month fixed effects, and 
controls for the proportion of employment in each of 19 sectoral categories 
at every time period in each area. Standard errors are clustered at the 
area level. 
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6. Discussion and conclusions 
This paper studied the relationship among payroll taxes, wages and employment by focusing on 
geographical variations in policy changes in Argentina. A distinguishing feature of this study is 
the availability of exact geographic-specific tax rates. The results indicate that a significant 
measurement error is carried over from the dependent variable (average wages) to the tax rates 
constructed by dividing tax payments by wages. The resulting coefficients in this study are 
roughly twice as high when using constructed rather than legal tax rates. Once this bias is 
accounted for, the results indicate that changes in payroll tax rates are only partially shifted onto 
wages, with estimates ranging between 0.4 and 0.9 percent per percentage-point reduction in the 
tax rate. They also point to the absence of any significant effect on employment (see Gruber, 
1997 and Nickell and Layard, 1999). 
 
The period under study includes reductions and increases in payroll tax rates. When these 
episodes are analyzed separately, the results indicate that only reductions in taxes have a 
significant impact on wages, although the statistical power of this analysis is limited due to the 
shorter amount of time available in the data after the tax increase. 
 
The presence of full or partial shifting with no employment effects may be explained by a 
combination of steep (inelastic) labor demand and supply functions, which result in large price 
effects and negligible quantity changes (Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999). These implied elasticities 
might result from the limited mobility of the labor force and the regional structure of the labor 
market in Argentina, since workers do not seem to react to changes in wages.
23
  Regional labor 
mobility is limited in Argentina: as noted by Galiani and Nickell (1999), the rate of migration is 
1 percent per year compared to 3 percent in the U.S. Regional migration is driven mostly by 
wage differentials, and it can be hampered by transaction costs. These transaction costs are 
higher in developing countries: there is limited availability of rental housing (because of lower 
enforcement of property rights), and credit scarcity restricts the mortgage market. Moreover, the 
Center and South of the country have had significantly higher wages and standards of living than 
the North, and these wage differentials have become strong pull factors for workers at least since 
the 1960s. These differences in levels are very large, and dominate any wedge that might be 
                                                 
23
 This point was suggested by an anonymous reviewer. 
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introduced by differential changes in regional tax rates. While the explanation of inelastic supply 
and demand is consistent with competitive models of wage determination, the presence of 
shifting only when taxes are reduced might also be indicative of the presence of downward wage 
rigidity. 
 
The main argument justifying the tax cuts introduced in 1995-1999 in Argentina (namely, that 
lower labor costs would increase employment) was not borne out by events. The wage gains, 
though significant (with estimates ranging between 0.4 and 0.9 percent per percentage-point 
reduction in the tax rate), are relatively minor when compared to the historical fluctuations of 
real wages in Argentina (Galiani and Gerchunoff, 2003). However, the tax cuts did have a 
significant effect on Government finance: payroll tax collection as a percentage of total wage 
income (considering the whole country, but excluding public sector and agricultural workers) fell 
by almost half from the mid 1990s to the early 2000s.  
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Appendix: Legal tax rates 
Screen capture of the standardized tax returns software listing areas and tax rates by date  
  
Screen capture of the standardized tax returns software listing areas and tax reduction 
coefficients 
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Screen capture of the standardized tax returns software showing the fixed nature of the 
area entry  
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Printout of the standardized tax returns software tax reduction coefficient tables  
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